Online Appendix for "The Role of Social Norms in Old-age Support: Evidence from China"

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Appendix

A.1 Different representations of outcome variables

In the previous results, the outcome variable regarding the amount of the transfer is the gross amount of the transfer. The results when using the gross amount of the transfer might be affected by the outliers in the survey sample, so I capped the amount of the transfer used, and this might create bias in the results. Using the logarithms of the amount of transfer and also the corresponding income or expenditure percentage help to reduce the sensitivity of the results caused by the outliers. For both datasets, I run Equation (**??**) on the new outcome variables for the amount of the transfer: the logarithms of the amount of the transfer and the amount of the transfer as a percentage of total income. The results are shown in Table A.3. For the CHARLS results, the father demonstration effect for the outcome variable, the percentage of income, appears to be consistent with the results in Table **??**, although with an 88% significance level. The log amount of the transfer has a marginally significant father demonstration effect that is consistent with the main results using the CHARLS dataset. The father demonstration effects for the transfer percentage in the CHARLS are both positive and insignificant. With the CHFS, the results show the insignificant but negative mother demonstration effect for the percentage outcome and the log amount of any transfer provided by the parents.

The transfers from the elderly are not included in the construction of the outcome variables used in the main regressions. I change the transfer outcome variables to net transfer variables. If $any\ transfer$ equals 1 and the parents receive the transfers from or are living together with their elderly parents, I change the corresponding value to 0. For the amount of the monetary transfer, I use the net transfer provided by the parents, which is the amount of transfer provided to the parents minus the amount of the transfer received by them from their elderly parents. The change is made for both datasets. The results for the net transfers are also included in Table A.3. They are consistent with the main results, except for the negative father demonstration effect for $any\ transfer$ in the CHFS. The magnitudes of the demonstration effect for the probability of providing any net transfer increase beyond the main results.

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A.2 Household size adjustment

Qian in her paper "Quantity-Quality and the One-Child Policy: the Only-Child Disadvantage in School Enrolment in Rural China" proposed a method to adjust for the number of children for households which with more than one child and first child is a girl. She constructed a sample to "estimate the lower bound of the absolute value of the family size effect". The method estimates the "extra" number of boys using the time variation of the key policy used in the paper and also the gender of the first child, then adjust the household size accordingly. Applying this method in my own setting, there are two ways of specification I can use. The first specification is to use the existing IV to estimate the number of "extra" children related to the gender of the first child for different provinces. In this specification, the gender dummy is 1 if the first child is a boy, and 0 otherwise. According to Qian (2009), the "extra" children in a family is mainly due to the first child is a girl. I use the second specification, which the time variation of my policy ban on gender selective abortions times the gender dummy for the first child. In the second specification, this dummy is 1 if the first child is a girl and 0 otherwise. Again the number of "extra" children is estimated for different provinces. If the estimation is insignificant for a province, that province-level household size will not be adjusted. Also, as Qian did in her paper, I adjust the number of household size based on whether a household belongs to Han or ethnic minority group.

A.3 *Han* culture and norm

As discussed in the background section, the norm of providing support for the elderly is closely linked with Confucianism and filial piety. This raises a possible concern: because the culture of Confucianism is well-known in Chinese society, not only do parents teach their children to provide support for the elderly in the future through the demonstration effect, but also the surrounding community, in schools, the neighbourhood, or the media, could shape young children's predilection to provide support to their parents in their old age. *Han* ethnic group is the majority ethnic group in China and filial piety is the key value in the *Han* group. If other channels apart from the parents affect children's preferences regarding old-age support, the demonstration effect from the parents will be smaller or less significant in a *Han*-ethnic dominated community or an exclusively *Han*-ethnic group. In the community survey questionnaire in the CHARLS, there is information on whether minority ethnic groups are living in the same community that the parents live in. I generate a dummy that equals 1 if there are minority ethnic groups living in the community, and 0 otherwise. From the results in Table A.6, the father demonstration effect for *any-transfer* and *visit days* in communities with people from minority ethnic groups are significant, yet the differences are insignificant for the fathers in two types of community.

There is no information on the community ethnic composition in the CHFS, but there is detailed information on P's ethnic groups. So I use this information to check whether *Han* ethnic group are more likely to demonstrate the filial piety to their children than other ethnic groups. I create a *Han* dummy that equals 1 for members of the *Han* ethnic group, and 0 otherwise. In the heterogeneity analysis results in Table A.7, the mother demonstration effects are significant for *Han* ethnic groups in terms of *any-transfer* and *visit days*. The effects are insignificant for the non-*Han* group. Yet, the differences are again insignificant. The heterogeneity analysis results from the

CHARLS and the CHFS seems to lead to opposite implications. The CHARLS results imply the social influence might act as the complement for the family demonstration effect, and the CHFS results indicate that mothers in *Han* ethnic group may still perceive self-demonstration of the filial piety more important than other ethnic minority groups. The only conclusion here is that the family demonstration effect and other social influences might co-exist as channels passing on the filial piety.

A.4 Additional Notes

Data and IV construction in CHARLS: Given the high average age of the respondents, the sample size for the available observations in terms of the transfer provided by the respondents to their parents is small. But many of the respondents have children of working age, so most of them receive support from their children. To fit the original dataset into my setting, I regard the support for the respondents provided by their children as the support from parents to their elderly parents discussed in the previous section. The respondents in the survey are the passive recipients of old-age support. Namely, they are the elderly the main regressions in the CHARLS. The grandchildren of the survey's respondents are the third generation. I construct a new sample that covers the adult children of the survey respondents, namely, the parents. However, due to the questionnaire design of the CHARLS, the demographic information on the parent and the grandchild generation is not as detailed as the information on the elderly parents in my regression. The available demographic variables in the 2011 wave about the grandchildren are only the gender and the number of them. In the 2013 and 2015 wave, the only available demographic variable is the number of the children.

I have had to make certain assumptions when constructing the gender of the first child IV in CHARLS. As discussed above, I have restructured the original dataset from a dataset where the main respondents are the O generation in my setting to a dataset in which the main observations are the children of the main respondents. In the regression setting, the children of the respondents are the P generation. The original dataset gives no information on the birth year but gives the gender composition and number of the K generation. The year of birth is available only if grandchildren are living with the first generation.

Moreover, many observations are missing for P and K that are not living together with O. Apart from this information, the dataset does provide information on the gender composition and number of the third generation if she or he is above the age of 16. For most households, I use this information to work out the gender of the first child. Some estimations are still needed in this process; they are based on the parents' age, especially the average age of female parents when their children are born, in order of birth, in both urban and rural areas.

For households affected by the policy ban after 2003 As discussed, using a subsample includes only households affected by the policy ban after 2003 might not provide well-identified results when the gender of the first child is kept as the instrumental variable. This is because, even with the policy ban, the gender ratio in some provinces is still high. I use a subsample check to provide relevant evidence. I divide the sample that includes only households affected by the policy ban after 2003 into two subsamples, one showing a high gender-ratio and the other showing a low gender-ratio. A province is classified as a high gender-ratio province 1 if in

the 2010 Population Census gender ratio there is above the national gender ratio, and 0 otherwise. Table A.14 shows the results of this simple subsample check. The father demonstration effects are positive for the amount of the transfer and the visits paid for the high gender-ratio provinces. The father effect is only significant for the visits paid in the low gender-ratio province subsample. The results from the CHFS are also in Table A.14, which shows that the only significant mother demonstration effect is the effect on the amount of the transfer provided in low gender-ratio provinces. The results from this simple sample check add a piece of suggestive evidence that depending on the gender ratio level, different provinces might lead to the demonstration effect differently.

A.5 Figures and Tables

Figure A.1: Actual gender ratios for the newborns in China: the yearly trend



Note: The information is obtained from the China Population and Employment Statistics Yearbook. 1982-2011. y-axis is the male to female gender ratio for the newborns (female=100). x-axis is the year 1982 to 2011. The yearly trend started in 1987. The circle dot is the national male to female gender ratio. The diamond dot represents the male to female gender ratio in urban areas only. The triangle and square dots are for the male to female gender ratio in township (suburban) areas and rural areas respectively.

Figure A.2: Actual gender ratios for the newborns in China: by birth order



Note: The information is obtained from the National Population Census. 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010. The figure shows four graphs on the male-to-female gender ratio (female=100) of the new-borns by different birth orders. From left to right, the graphs show the gender ratios in China, urban areas, township (suburban) areas, and rural areas. The circle dot is the overall gender ratio. The diamond dot represents the ratio for the first-born children. The triangle and square dots are for the male to female gender for the second-born and the third-born children respectively.

Table A.1: The demonstration effect on the provision of old-age support: different cluster levels

	IV: CHARLS (mostly rural)						IV: CHFS(mostly urban)		
cluster-level	O household			province			P household		
VARIABLES	*any-transfer*	*amount*	*visit days*	*any-transfer*	*amount*	*visit days*	*any-transfer*	*amount*	*visit days*
$maleP$	-0.0802**	-230.5	-29.89***	-0.0802*	-230.5	-29.89***	-0.0518	-237.7	-3.363
	(0.0391)	(392.6)	(8.057)	(0.0467)	(327.1)	(11.26)	(0.0393)	(159.4)	(13.13)
sex_ratioK	-0.0450	-273.3	-4.315	-0.0450	-273.3	-4.315	-0.0733**	-96.20	-46.92***
	(0.0411)	(356.7)	(7.011)	(0.0428)	(398.9)	(6.859)	(0.0362)	(151.3)	(10.86)
$maleP \times sex\_ratioK$	0.125***	472.9	76.49***	0.125**	472.9	76.49***	0.0412	259.2	49.37**
	(0.0482)	(444.9)	(9.592)	(0.0523)	(372.5)	(14.47)	(0.0601)	(255.6)	(19.88)
$sex\_ratioK+$	0.079***	200.0	72.17***	0.079***	200.0	72.17***	-0.032	163.0	2.455
$maleP \times sex\_ratioK$	(0.022)	(247.3)	(6.221)	(0.022)	(231.9)	(12.89)	(0.042)	(181.5)	(14.77)
P demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
O demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	12,232	12,232	12,232	12,232	12,232	12,232	19,509	19,509	19,509
R-squared	0.201	0.050	0.610	0.201	0.050	0.610	0.280	0.203	0.159
Mean	0.401	831.2	118.7	0.401	831.2	118.7	0.303	489.1	91.66

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate statistical significance. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. $maleP$ is the gender of P. sex_ratioK is the gender ratio of K in the household of P and represents the mother demonstration effect. $sex\_ratioK + maleP \times sex\_ratioK$ shows the father demonstration effect. The three outcome variables are the dummy indicating whether parents provide any financial transfer to their elderly parents (*any-transfer*), the amount of any transfer provided (*amount*), and the number of days spent on visits paid to their elderly parents per year (*visit days*). The key controls are P's household-size, gender, age, income education, *hukou* status, whether live in urban areas, siblings, marital status, occupation, distance from O, and O's transfer to P, age, education, working status, retirement status, any deposit, *hukou* status, household income and hours of O taking care of P's K, depending on the availability of the information in the CHARLS and the CHFS. The standard error is clustered at the O's household-level and the province level for the CHARLS and the cluster-level is the P's household-level in the CHFS. The IVs are the gender of the first child for households having at least one child in or after 2003 and the prefectural compliance index for the CHARLS and the gender of the first child for households having at least one child in or after 2003 for the CHFS.

Table A.2: The demonstration effect on the provision of old-age support: Dummy gender ratio

	IV: CHARLS (mostly rural)			IV: CHFS (mostly urban)		
VARIABLES	*any-transfer*	*amount*	*visit days*	*any-transfer*	*amount*	*visit days*
maleP	-0.0774	-230.3	-31.03**	-0.0497	-230.8	-1.524
	(0.0491)	(308.0)	(12.27)	(0.0432)	(165.2)	(16.01)
more_sons	-0.0387	-254.6	-3.464	-0.0695**	-89.49	-44.25***
	(0.0406)	(368.1)	(7.092)	(0.0321)	(126.1)	(10.14)
$maleP \times more\_sons$	0.120**	467.7	78.72***	0.0397	242.9	46.80**
	(0.0566)	(419.3)	(14.75)	(0.0606)	(271.0)	(22.87)
hh-size	-0.00835	-18.43	-2.253	-0.00467	-14.67	-7.549***
	(0.0131)	(81.63)	(1.865)	(0.00498)	(18.17)	(1.227)
maleP× *hh-size*	-0.000595	307.2**	10.72***	-0.00509	26.01	13.32***
	(0.0119)	(149.2)	(2.888)	(0.00624)	(23.66)	(2.734)
more_sons+	0.081***	213.1	75.25***	-0.030	153.4	2.551
$maleP \times more\_sons$	(0.029)	(207.1)	(12.36)	(0.043)	(190.1)	(16.83)
P demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
O demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	12,232	12,232	12,232	19,509	19,509	19,509
R-squared	0.200	0.049	0.602	0.280	0.202	0.158

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate statistical significance. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. *maleP* is the gender of P. $more\_sonsK$ is a dummy representing whether the gender ratio of K in the household of P is larger or equal to 0.5, and it is the mother demonstration effect. $more\_sons + maleP \times sex\_ratioK$ shows the father demonstration effect. The three outcome variables are the dummy indicating whether parents provide any financial transfer to their elderly parents (*any-transfer*), the amount of any transfer provided (*amount*), and the number of days spent on visits paid to their elderly parents per year (*visit days*). The key controls are P's household-size, gender, age, income education, *hukou* status, whether live in urban areas, siblings, marital status, occupation, distance from O, and O's transfer to P, age, education, working status, retirement status, any deposit, *hukou* status, household income and hours of O taking care of P's K, depending on the availability of the information in the CHARLS and the CHFS. The standard error is clustered at the prefectural city level for the CHARLS and the cluster-level is the province-level in the CHFS. The IVs are the gender of the first child for households having at least one child in or after 2003 and the prefectural compliance index for the CHARLS and the gender of the first child for households having at least one child in or after 2003 for the CHFS.

Table A.3: Different representations of the probability and the amount of transfers

	IV: CHARLS (mostly rural)				IV: CHFS (mostly urban)			
VARIABLES	any net transfer	net total *amount*	*log* amount of transfer	percentage of income	any net transfer	net total *amount*	*log* amount of transfer	percentage of income
maleP	-0.0969*	-35,144	-0.315	-0.0468**	-0.00450	382.3	-0.527*	-0.00497
	(0.0514)	(37,300)	(0.363)	(0.0226)	(0.0359)	(851.0)	(0.307)	(0.00649)
sex_ratioK	-0.0354	3,950	-0.141	-0.0178*	-0.0977***	-104.9	-0.361†	-0.00205
	(0.0439)	(4,241)	(0.290)	(0.0105)	(0.0264)	(925.4)	(0.224)	(0.00616)
maleP × *sex_ratioK*	0.129**	-1,141	0.719	0.0593*	-0.0375	-507.8	0.0676	-0.000853
	(0.0582)	(14,263)	(0.481)	(0.0335)	(0.0521)	(1,523)	(0.448)	(0.0104)
hh-size	-0.012	-8,070	-0.117	-0.00530***	-0.010**	-8.107	-0.0912**	-0.00125
	(0.014)	(7,373)	(0.0878)	(0.00148)	(0.005)	(30.94)	(0.0421)	(0.000819)
maleP× *hh-size*	0.011	10,244	0.0754	0.0137***	-0.006	-61.41	0.0601	0.00137
	(0.014)	(8,902)	(0.0871)	(0.00325)	(0.006)	(54.87)	(0.0486)	(0.00112)
sex_ratioK+	0.094***	2,809	0.578*	0.041	-0.135***	-612.7	-0.293	-0.002
maleP × *sex_ratioK*	(0.026)	(15,917)	(0.346)	(0.030)	(0.036)	(788.7)	(0.309)	(0.007)
P demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
P income level	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
O demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	12,232	12,232	12,232	12,232	19,509	19,509	19,509	19,509
R-squared	0.198	0.006	0.120	0.507	0.056	0.009	0.202	0.040

Notes:Robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate statistical significance. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. $maleP$ is the gender of P. sex_ratioK is the gender ratio of K in the household of P and represents the mother demonstration effect. $sex\_ratioK + maleP \times sex\_ratioK$ shows the father demonstration effect. The outcome variables from left to right are the probability of providing any net transfers, the net amount of the transfer provided, the log amount of the total transfer provided, and the percentage of the amount of the total transfer in the total household income of P. The key controls are P's household-size, gender, age, income education, *hukou* status, whether live in urban areas, siblings, marital status, occupation, distance from O, and O's transfer to P, age, education, working status, retirement status, any deposit, *hukou* status, household income and hours of O taking care of P's K, depending on the availability of the information in the CHARLS and the CHFS. The standard error is clustered at the prefectural city level for the CHARLS and the cluster-level is the province-level in the CHFS. The IVs are the gender of the first child for households having at least one child in or after 2003 and the prefectural compliance index for the CHARLS and the gender of the first child for households having at least one child in or after 2003 for the CHFS.

Table A.4: Household size adjusted using Qian's method (Qian, 2009)

	IV: CHFS (mostly rural)					
	Specification 1			Specification 2		
VARIABLES	*any-transfer*	*amount*	*visit days*	*any-transfer*	*amount*	*visit days*
maleP	-0.0540	-223.0	0.756	-0.0508	-219.9	0.112
	(0.0422)	(163.9)	(15.64)	(0.0439)	(170.3)	(16.27)
sex_ratioK	-0.0733**	-98.71	-46.90***	-0.0738**	-99.16	-46.98***
	(0.0345)	(137.2)	(10.80)	(0.0343)	(135.9)	(10.79)
maleP × *sex_ratioK*	0.0408	260.5	49.19**	0.0418	262.6	49.49**
	(0.0648)	(294.6)	(24.57)	(0.0645)	(291.9)	(24.56)
hh-size	-0.00923	-17.27	-10.55***	-0.00782	-14.77	-9.944***
	(0.00574)	(19.91)	(1.184)	(0.00602)	(17.63)	(1.199)
maleP× *hh-size*	-0.000205	36.45	17.02***	-0.00307	29.84	15.80***
	(0.00727)	(29.98)	(2.787)	(0.00800)	(25.10)	(2.994)
sex_ratioK+	-0.032	161.8	2.294	-0.032	163.4	2.504
maleP × *sex_ratioK*	(0.045)	(204.7)	(17.94)	(0.045)	(203.6)	(17.94)
P demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
O demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	19,509	19,509	19,509	19,509	19,509	19,509
R-squared	0.280	0.203	0.159	0.280	0.202	0.159

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate statistical significance. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. *maleP* is the gender of *P*. *more_sonsK* is a dummy representing whether the gender ratio of *K* in the household of *P* is larger or equal to 0.5, and it is the mother demonstration effect. *more_sons* + *maleP* × *sex_ratioK* shows the father demonstration effect. The three outcome variables are the dummy indicating whether parents provide any financial transfer to their elderly parents (*any-transfer*), the amount of any transfer provided (*amount*), and the number of days spent on visits paid to their elderly parents per year (*visit days*). The key controls are *P*'s household-size, gender, age, income education, *hukou* status, whether live in urban areas, siblings, marital status, occupation, distance from *O*, and *O*'s transfer to *P*, age, education, working status, retirement status, any deposit, *hukou* status, household income and hours of *O* taking care of *P*'s *K*, depending on the availability of the information in the CHFS. The standard error is clustered at the cluster-level is the province-level. The IV is the gender of the first child for households having at least one child in or after 2003 for the CHFS.

Table A.5: Son preference in China

	Urban areas		Rural areas	
CHFS	No.	Percentage	No.	Percentage
Prefer sons	1,159	8.43%	621	9.25%
Prefer daughters	2,904	21.12%	672	10.01%
Indifferent	9,685	70.45%	5,423	80.75%

Notes: The question asked in the 2013 CHFS wave is "Do you think it is better to have a son or it is better to have a daughter?". I separate the sample into people who live in urban areas and those who live in rural areas.

Table A.6: Heterogeneity Check: Living in a community with minority ethnic groups

	IV: CHARLS (mostly rural)		
VARIABLES	*any-transfer*	*amount*	*visit days*
maleP	-0.0591	-174.0	-49.90***
	(0.0725)	(494.5)	(17.56)
sex_ratioK	-0.0141	-559.5	-5.602
(Non-Mino. mother	(0.0780)	(535.2)	(10.25)
demonstration effects)			
minority	-0.0300	-412.2	-0.749
	(0.0677)	(411.8)	(9.165)
$maleP \times sex\_ratioK$	0.0469	540.2	104.3***
	(0.114)	(585.2)	(22.49)
$sex\_ratioK \times Minority$	-0.0760	695.4	6.357
(Difference in mother	(0.114)	(699.5)	(13.90)
demonstration effects)			
$maleP \times Minority$	-0.0624	-1.668	20.78
	(0.0920)	(575.3)	(15.57)
$sex\_ratioK \times Minority$	0.183	-239.6	-35.77
$\times maleP$	(0.163)	(864.3)	(22.90)
Mino. father	0.140***	436.4	69.29***
demonstration effects	(0.050)	(361.1)	(13.63)
Non-Mino. father	0.033	-19.33	98.70***
demonstration effects	(0.065)	(453.5)	(18.73)
Difference in father	0.107	455.8	-29.40
demonstration effects	(0.102)	(720.7)	(18.36)
Mino. mother	-0.090	135.8	0.754
demonstration effects	(0.062)	(476.0)	(10.15)
P demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes
O demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	12,232	12,232	12,232
R-squared	0.201	0.050	0.601

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate statistical significance. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The three outcome variables are the dummy indicating whether parents provide any financial transfer to their elderly parents (*any-transfer*), the amount of any transfer provided (*amount*), and the number of days spent on visits paid to their elderly parents per year (*visit days*). The key controls are P's household-size, gender, age, income education, *hukou* status, whether live in urban areas, siblings, marital status, occupation, distance from O, and O's transfer to P, age, education, working status, retirement status, any deposit, *hukou* status, household income and hours of O taking care of P's K. The standard error is clustered at the prefectural city level for the CHARLS. The IVs are the gender of the first child for households having at least one child in or after 2003 and the prefectural compliance index for the CHARLS. $maleP$ is the gender of P. *minority* is a dummy representing whether P live in communities with any minority ethnic groups, and it interacts with key regressors. sex_ratioK is the gender ratio of K in the household of P and the mother demonstration effect for P living in communities with any minority ethnic groups. $sex\_ratioK \times minority$ represents the difference between the mother demonstration effects for P living in communities with any minority ethnic groups and the mother demonstration effects for P living in Han-only communities, which should be negative and significant if the mother demonstration effects for P living in communities with any minority ethnic groups are larger than the mother demonstration effects for P living in Han-only communities.

Table A.7: Heterogeneity Check: Ethnic groups

	IV: CHFS (mostly urban)		
VARIABLES	*any-transfer*	*amount*	*visit days*
maleP	-0.0558	-212.6	15.15
	(0.135)	(537.3)	(36.25)
sex_ratioK	-0.184	-93.91	-5.164
(Non-Han mother demonstration effects)	(0.161)	(558.5)	(45.56)
Han	-0.0462	-23.79	30.46
	(0.0677)	(411.8)	(9.165)
$maleP \times sex\_ratioK$	0.0618	253.8	16.61
	(0.226)	(935.7)	(66.02)
$sex\_ratioK \times Han$	0.126	7.621	-47.45
(Difference in mother demonstration effects)	(0.166)	(556.6)	(46.18)
$maleP \times Han$	0.0133	-10.09	-24.61
	(0.136)	(506.5)	(38.11)
$sex\_ratioK \times Han$	-0.0355	-20.43	42.04
$\times maleP$	(0.241)	(889.5)	(72.12)
Han father demonstration effects	-0.031	147.0	6.036
	(0.047)	(189.5)	(20.19)
Non-Han father demonstration effects	-0.122	159.8	11.44
	(0.191)	(690.2)	(46.56)
Difference in father demonstration effects	0.091	-12.81	-5.408
	(0.199)	(650.6)	(56.40)
Han mother demonstration effects	-0.058*	-86.28	-52.61***
	(0.034)	(130.7)	(11.19)
P demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes
O demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	19,509	19,509	19,509
R-squared	0.280	0.203	0.160

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate statistical significance. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The three outcome variables are the dummy indicating whether parents provide any financial transfer to their elderly parents (*any-transfer*), the amount of any transfer provided (*amount*), and the number of days spent on visits paid to their elderly parents per year (*visit days*). The key controls are P's household-size, gender, age, income education, *hukou* status, whether live in urban areas, siblings, marital status, occupation, distance from O, and O's transfer to P, age, education, working status, retirement status, any deposit, *hukou* status, household income and hours of O taking care of P's K. The standard error is clustered at the province level for the CHFS. The IV is the gender of the first child for households having at least one child in or after 2003 for the CHFS. $maleP$ is the gender of P. Han is a dummy representing whether P's ethnicity is Han, and it interacts with key regressors. sex_ratioK is the gender ratio of K in the household of P and the mother demonstration effect for P as Han. $sex\_ratioK \times Han$ represents the difference between the mother demonstration effects for P as Han and the mother demonstration effects for P as other minority ethnic groups, which should be negative and significant if the mother demonstration effects for P as Han are larger than the mother demonstration effects for P as other minority ethnic groups.

Table A.8: Heterogeneity Check: Household income level

	IV: CHARLS (mostly rural)			IV: CHFS(mostly urban)		
VARIABLES	*any-transfer*	*amount*	*visit days*	*any-transfer*	*amount*	*visit days*
maleP	-0.104	-780.7**	-17.08	-0.0448	-354.0*	-29.87
	(0.0654)	(369.9)	(14.29)	(0.0592)	(199.6)	(18.96)
sex_ratioK	-0.0214	-153.4	8.847	-0.0789	-470.0**	-67.30***
(Low income mother demonstrate effects)	(0.0628)	(339.8)	(10.93)	(0.0514)	(212.2)	(14.98)
high income	0.0553	-600.1	24.80***	0.00333	-587.2***	-19.90*
	(0.0567)	(426.7)	(9.306)	(0.0400)	(186.2)	(11.44)
maleP × *sex_ratioK*	0.198**	1,136**	69.74***	0.0326	500.9	105.2***
	(0.0870)	(484.7)	(19.72)	(0.0904)	(335.2)	(29.20)
sex_ratioK× *high income*	-0.0451	-256.4	-22.31	0.0121	778.4**	41.26**
(Differences in mother demonstrate effects)	(0.0930)	(625.2)	(16.06)	(0.0728)	(361.8)	(19.03)
maleP× *high income*	0.130	1,202**	-42.42***	-0.0141	229.5	50.48**
	(0.0856)	(593.2)	(14.58)	(0.0721)	(254.8)	(22.78)
maleP × *sex_ratioK*	-0.276*	-1,676*	39.33*	0.0183	-513.5	-112.3***
×*high income*	(0.142)	(857.1)	(23.61)	(0.130)	(466.6)	(38.19)
High income father	-0.145**	-949.1*	95.61***	-0.016	295.8	-33.14
demonstrate effects	(0.068)	(502.8)	(16.47)	(0.062)	(289.8)	(26.55)
Low income father	0.176***	983.0***	78.58***	-0.046	30.91	37.92*
demonstrate effects	(0.043)	(311.8)	(15.94)	(0.063)	(265.1)	(22.25)
Differences in father	-0.321***	-1932.2***	17.02	0.030	264.9	-71.06**
demonstrate effects	(0.093)	(702.0)	(16.95)	(0.088)	(382.1)	(32.02)
High income mother	-0.066***	-409.7	-13.46	-0.067	308.4	-26.03*
demonstrate effects	(0.065)	(635.4)	(11.10)	(0.048)	(239.7)	(13.29)
P demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
O demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	12,232	12,232	12,232	19,509	19,509	19,509
R-squared	0.195	0.047	0.600	0.280	0.199	0.154

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate statistical significance. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The three outcome variables are the dummy indicating whether parents provide any financial transfer to their elderly parents (*any-transfer*), the amount of any transfer provided (*amount*), and the number of days spent on visits paid to their elderly parents per year (*visit days*). The key controls are P's household-size, gender, age, income education, *hukou* status, whether live in urban areas, siblings, marital status, occupation, distance from O, and O's transfer to P, age, education, working status, retirement status, any deposit, *hukou* status, household income and hours of O taking care of P's K, depending on the availability of the information in the CHARLS and the CHFS. The standard error is clustered at the prefectural city level for the CHARLS and the cluster-level is the province-level in the CHFS. The IVs are the gender of the first child for households having at least one child in or after 2003 and the prefectural compliance index for the CHARLS and the gender of the first child for households having at least one child in or after 2003 for the CHFS. *maleP* is the gender of P. *high income* is a dummy representing P's income-level, and it interacts with key regressors. *sex_ratioK* is the gender ratio of K in the household of P and the mother demonstration effect for P with high-level income. *sex_ratioK*× *high income* represents the difference between the mother demonstration effects for P with high-level income and the mother demonstration effects for P with low-level income, which should be negative and significant if the mother demonstration effects for P with high-level income are larger than the mother demonstration effects for P with low-level income.

Table A.9: Heterogeneity Check: Single child family

	IV: CHARLS (mostly rural)			IV: CHFS(mostly urban)		
VARIABLES	*any-transfer*	*amount*	*visit days*	*any-transfer*	*amount*	*visit days*
maleP	-0.0623	1,069	-15.65	0.00656	-394.9	-28.71
	(0.104)	(998.0)	(20.78)	(0.0829)	(317.8)	(37.09)
sex_ratioK	0.0160	-209.2	-4.973	0.0329	-854.0***	-100.4***
(non-singleK HH mother	(0.115)	(777.9)	(17.51)	(0.0835)	(264.2)	(38.34)
demonstrate effects)						
singleK	0.0346	16.06	0.577	0.0822*	-472.6***	-23.44
	(0.0635)	(456.5)	(10.84)	(0.0441)	(160.4)	(22.81)
maleP × *sex_ratioK*	0.112	-605.5	118.8***	-0.0838	769.1	177.9**
	(0.198)	(1,706)	(38.17)	(0.161)	(634.6)	(70.41)
sex_ratioK× *singleK*	-0.0830	50.71	5.181	-0.141	1,020***	68.50
(Differences in mother	(0.125)	(766.7)	(19.55)	(0.0872)	(305.3)	(43.22)
demonstrate effects)						
maleP× *singleK*	-0.00938	-1,004	1.102	-0.0794	286.8	61.52*
	(0.128)	(1,170)	(20.48)	(0.0780)	(279.8)	(37.03)
maleP × *sex_ratioK*	0.0281	1,192	-44.64	0.162	-684.1	-166.7**
×*singleK*	(0.232)	(1,991)	(36.89)	(0.154)	(543.5)	(69.94)
singleK HH father	0.073	428.5	74.32***	-0.031	250.7*	-20.66
demonstrate effects	(0.049)	(409.4)	(11.42)	(0.036)	(146.2)	(15.62)
Non-singleK HH father	0.128	-814.6	113.7***	-0.051	-84.88	77.49
demonstrate effects	(0.129)	(1,053)	(30.72)	(0.119)	(567.3)	(63.71)
Differences in father	-0.055	1,243	-39.46	0.020	335.6	-98.16
demonstrate effects	(0.167)	(1,399)	(28.09)	(0.108)	(507.1)	(64.70)
singleK HH mother	-0.061*	-158.4	0.207	-0.108***	165.7	-31.86***
demonstrate effects	(0.040)	(380.3)	(8.022)	(0.034)	(158.6)	(11.10)
P demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
O demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	12,232	12,232	12,232	19,509	19,509	19,509
R-squared	0.200	0.047	0.597	0.278	0.198	0.151

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate statistical significance. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The three outcome variables are the dummy indicating whether parents provide any financial transfer to their elderly parents (*any-transfer*), the amount of any transfer provided (*amount*), and the number of days spent on visits paid to their elderly parents per year (*visit days*). The key controls are *P*'s household-size, gender, age, income education, *hukou* status, whether live in urban areas, siblings, marital status, occupation, distance from *O*, and *O*'s transfer to *P*, age, education, working status, retirement status, any deposit, *hukou* status, household income and hours of *O* taking care of *P*'s *K*, depending on the availability of the information in the CHARLS and the CHFS. The standard error is clustered at the prefectural city level for the CHARLS and the cluster-level is the province-level in the CHFS. The IVs are the gender of the first child for households having at least one child in or after 2003 and the prefectural compliance index for the CHARLS and the gender of the first child for households having at least one child in or after 2003 for the CHFS. *maleP* is the gender of *P*. *singleK* is a dummy representing whether *P* have only one child, and it interacts with key regressors. *sex_ratioK* is the gender ratio of *K* in the household of *P* and the mother demonstration effect for *P* with only one child. *sex_ratioK* × *singleK* represents the difference between the mother demonstration effects for *P* with only one child and the mother demonstration effects for *P* with more than one child, which should be negative and significant if the mother demonstration effects for *P* with only one child are larger than the mother demonstration effects for *P* with more than one child.

Table A.10: Heterogeneity Check: Urban-rural differences

	IV: CHARLS (mostly rural)			IV: CHFS(mostly urban)		
VARIABLES	*any-transfer*	*amount*	*visit days*	*any-transfer*	*amount*	*visit days*
maleP	-0.108*	-773.6*	-39.24**	0.0675	118.6	-95.96*
	(0.0618)	(406.0)	(15.80)	(0.131)	(314.6)	(51.21)
sex_ratioK	-0.0640	-495.6	-4.914	0.00835	-522.6*	-16.54
(Rural mother demonstrate effects)	(0.0605)	(423.5)	(8.866)	(0.127)	(275.8)	(39.53)
urban	-0.0904	-320.3	12.19	0.0987	-131.6	23.86
	(0.0615)	(494.2)	(11.21)	(0.0852)	(178.5)	(24.47)
maleP × *sex_ratioK*	0.133	1,234**	99.33***	-0.154	-251.1	259.7***
	(0.0828)	(622.2)	(20.21)	(0.196)	(482.3)	(75.87)
sex_ratioK × *urban*	0.0489	674.6	17.13	-0.0905	526.2	-46.43
(Differences in mother demonstrate effects)	(0.103)	(858.2)	(18.51)	(0.150)	(336.5)	(40.78)
maleP × *urban*	0.0511	1,358*	15.15	-0.125	-391.4	92.35*
	(0.0751)	(765.2)	(13.60)	(0.116)	(336.2)	(48.16)
maleP × *sex_ratioK*	-0.0125	-2,108*	-50.96**	0.219	604.9	-233.3***
×*urban*	(0.131)	(1,219)	(21.06)	(0.196)	(580.7)	(77.24)
Urban father	0.104*	-694.7	60.59***	-0.017	357.3	-36.54*
demonstrate effects	(0.062)	(519.9)	(14.63)	(0.042)	(251.1)	(21.54)
Rural father	0.068*	738.5**	94.41***	-0.145	-773.7*	243.1***
demonstrate effects	(0.041)	(308.1)	(17.54)	(0.133)	(408.0)	(66.24)
Differences in father	0.036	-1,433**	-33.82*	0.128	1,131**	-279.7***
demonstrate effects	(0.088)	(703.3)	(18.08)	(0.132)	(533.4)	(73.37)
Urban mother	-0.015	179.1	12.22	-0.082*	3.561	-62.98***
demonstrate effects	(0.071)	(813.6)	(16.33)	(0.044)	(154.7)	(11.19)
P demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
O demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	12,232	12,232	12,232	19,509	19,509	19,509
R-squared	0.201	0.047	0.601	0.279	0.194	0.094

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate statistical significance. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The three outcome variables are the dummy indicating whether parents provide any financial transfer to their elderly parents (*any-transfer*), the amount of any transfer provided (*amount*), and the number of days spent on visits paid to their elderly parents per year (*visit days*). The key controls are P's household-size, gender, age, income education, *hukou* status, whether live in urban areas, siblings, marital status, occupation, distance from O, and O's transfer to P, age, education, working status, retirement status, any deposit, *hukou* status, household income and hours of O taking care of P's K. The standard error is clustered at the prefectural city level for the CHARLS. The IVs are the gender of the first child for households having at least one child in or after 2003 and the prefectural compliance index for the CHARLS. *maleP* is the gender of P. *urban* is a dummy representing whether P live in urban areas, and it interacts with key regressors. *sex_ratioK* is the gender ratio of K in the household of P and the mother demonstration effect for P with any older brothers. *sex_ratioK* × *urban* represents the difference between the mother demonstration effects for P live in urban areas and the mother demonstration effects for P live in rural areas, which should be negative and significant if the mother demonstration effects for P live in urban areas are larger than the mother demonstration effects for P live in rural areas.

Table A.11: Subsample analysis: Urban-singleton households

	IV: CHARLS (mostly rural)			IV: CHFS (mostly urban)		
VARIABLES	*any-transfer*	*amount*	*visit days*	*any-transfer*	*amount*	*visit days*
Urban-singleton						
maleP	-0.00299	-592.9	8.020	-0.0816**	-180.6	8.082
	(0.0568)	(722.7)	(12.85)	(0.0328)	(131.2)	(13.64)
sex_ratioK	-0.0157	-244.4	7.033	-0.0896***	-13.23	-24.11**
	(0.0670)	(911.7)	(15.49)	(0.0343)	(158.8)	(10.14)
maleP × *sex_ratioK*	0.00379	877.1	19.02	0.0921	173.6	26.14
	(0.0830)	(1,215)	(18.31)	(0.0580)	(255.3)	(22.34)
sex_ratioK+	-0.012	632.7	26.04**	0.002	160.3	2.028
maleP × *sex_ratioK*	(0.045)	(622.6)	(12.56)	(0.039)	(157.7)	(17.27)
Observations	2,466	2,466	2,466	9,364	9,364	9,364
R-squared	0.230	0.085	0.612	0.254	0.206	0.128
Others						
maleP	-0.142**	55.45	-29.65**	0.0655	-301.6	-6.517
	(0.0593)	(346.3)	(14.86)	(0.103)	(369.0)	(38.15)
sex_ratioK	-0.0634	-279.4	-3.850	-0.0101	-258.5	-122.7***
	(0.0526)	(430.1)	(8.439)	(0.0650)	(181.0)	(29.26)
maleP × *sex_ratioK*	0.184***	391.7	92.12***	-0.149	477.7	127.6**
	(0.0681)	(504.5)	(17.89)	(0.140)	(538.1)	(53.40)
sex_ratioK+	0.121***	112.2	88.26***	-0.158	219.1	4.876
maleP × *sex_ratioK*	(0.030)	(179.7)	(14.27)	(0.099)	(436.5)	(40.35)
Observations	9,766	9,766	9,766	10,145	10,145	10,145
R-squared	0.195	0.043	0.610	0.293	0.136	0.196
P demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
O demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate statistical significance. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. *maleP* is the gender of P. *sex_ratioK* is the gender ratio of K in the household of P and represents the mother demonstration effect. *sex_ratioK* + *maleP* × *sex_ratioK* shows the father demonstration effect. The three outcome variables are the dummy indicating whether parents provide any financial transfer to their elderly parents (*any-transfer*), the amount of any transfer provided (*amount*), and the number of days spent on visits paid to their elderly parents per year (*visit days*). The key controls are P's household-size, gender, age, income education, *hukou* status, whether live in urban areas, siblings, marital status, occupation, distance from O, and O's transfer to P, age, education, working status, retirement status, any deposit, *hukou* status, household income and hours of O taking care of P's K, depending on the availability of the information in the CHARLS and the CHFS. The standard error is clustered at the prefectural city level for the CHARLS and the cluster-level is the province-level in the CHFS. The IVs are the gender of the first child for households having at least one child in or after 2003 and the prefectural compliance index for the CHARLS and the gender of the first child for households having at least one child in or after 2003 for the CHFS. The sample is split based on whether P live in urban areas and have only one child.

Table A.12: Heterogeneity Check: Family compositions of P

	IV: CHARLS (mostly rural)		
VARIABLES	*any-transfer*	*amount*	*visit days*
maleP	-0.138**	-483.6	-30.12**
	(0.0549)	(421.6)	(13.41)
sex_ratioK	-0.0851	-662.8	4.674
(Without older brothers mother demonstrate)	(0.0578)	(473.8)	(9.214)
older bro	-0.0370	-559.4	17.30
	(0.0564)	(437.7)	(10.88)
maleP × *sex_ratioK*	0.239***	851.1	73.15***
	(0.0729)	(604.3)	(18.52)
sex_ratioK× *older bro*	0.104	1,013	-17.87
(Differences in mother demonstrate effects)	(0.0980)	(718.1)	(17.44)
maleP× *older bro*	0.212***	519.7	-24.12
	(0.0736)	(725.1)	(15.26)
maleP × *sex_ratioK*	-0.358***	-721.7	37.93
×*older bro*	(0.125)	(1,183)	(24.21)
With older brothers father demonstrate	-0.101	479.5	97.87***
	(0.063)	(754.3)	(16.26)
Without older brothers father demonstrate	0.154***	188.3	77.82***
	(0.035)	(256.5)	(14.61)
Differences in father demonstrate effects	-0.255***	291.2	20.05
	(0.078)	(909.5)	(14.35)
With older brothers mother demonstrate	0.019	350.2	-13.20
	(0.074)	(615.3)	(13.96)
P demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes
O demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	12,232	12,232	12,232
R-squared	0.196	0.049	0.599

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate statistical significance. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The three outcome variables are the dummy indicating whether parents provide any financial transfer to their elderly parents (*any-transfer*), the amount of any transfer provided (*amount*), and the number of days spent on visits paid to their elderly parents per year (*visit days*). The key controls are P's household-size, gender, age, income education, *hukou* status, whether live in urban areas, siblings, marital status, occupation, distance from O, and O's transfer to P, age, education, working status, retirement status, any deposit, *hukou* status, household income and hours of O taking care of P's K. The standard error is clustered at the prefectural city level for the CHARLS. The IVs is the gender of the first child born in or after 2003 and the prefectural compliance index for the CHARLS. *maleP* is the gender of P. *older bro* is a dummy representing whether P have any older brothers, and it interacts with key regressors. *sex_ratioK* is the gender ratio of K in the household of P and the mother demonstration effect for P with any older brothers. *sex_ratioK* × *old bro* represents the difference between the mother demonstration effects for P with any older brothers and the mother demonstration effects for P without any older brothers, which should be negative and significant if the mother demonstration effects for P with any older brothers are larger than the mother demonstration effects for P without any older brothers.

Table A.13: The demonstration effect without controlling for the transfers from generation O

	IV: CHARLS (mostly rural)			IV: CHFS(mostly urban)		
VARIABLES	*any-transfer*	*amount*	*visit days*	*any-transfer*	*amount*	*visit days*
$maleP$	-0.121**	-325.3	-10.26	-0.0533	-240.2	-3.723
	(0.0595)	(312.8)	(9.130)	(0.0521)	(185.3)	(16.79)
sex_ratioK	-0.116**	-302.3	-2.654	-0.0127	5.500	-37.15***
	(0.0494)	(403.7)	(7.169)	(0.0374)	(135.3)	(10.36)
$maleP \times sex\_ratioK$	0.224***	649.7	47.79***	0.0422	261.0	50.83**
	(0.0772)	(448.7)	(11.04)	(0.0747)	(309.2)	(24.52)
hh-size	-0.00751	-26.42	-3.820*	-0.00589	-16.78	-10.09***
	(0.0136)	(74.95)	(2.000)	(0.00685)	(19.78)	(1.273)
$maleP\times$ *hh-size*	0.00385	355.5**	14.50***	-0.000755	41.74	17.12***
	(0.0136)	(145.8)	(2.750)	(0.00860)	(27.53)	(3.122)
$sex\_ratioK+$	0.108***	347.4*	45.13***	0.030	266.4	13.67
$maleP \times sex\_ratioK$	(0.050)	(181.4)	(7.853)	(0.055)	(219.6)	(18.58)
Transfer from O	No	No	No	No	No	No
O taking care for K	No	No	No	No	No	No
P demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
O demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	12,232	12,232	12,232	12,232	12,232	12,232
R-squared	0.084	0.049	0.670	0.214	0.186	0.140

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate statistical significance. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. $maleP$ is the gender of P. sex_ratioK is the gender ratio of K in the household of P and represents the mother demonstration effect. $sex\_ratioK + maleP \times sex\_ratioK$ shows the father demonstration effect. The three outcome variables are the dummy indicating whether parents provide any financial transfer to their elderly parents ($any\text{-}transfer$), the amount of any transfer provided ($amount$), and the number of days spent on visits paid to their elderly parents per year ($visit\ days$). The key controls are P's household-size, gender, age, income education, *hukou* status, whether live in urban areas, siblings, marital status, occupation, distance from O, and O's age, education, working status, retirement status, any deposit, *hukou* status, and household income, depending on the availability of the information in the CHARLS and the CHFS. The standard error is clustered at the prefectural city level for the CHARLS and the cluster-level is the province-level in the CHFS. The IVs are the gender of the first child for households having at least one child in or after 2003 and the prefectural compliance index for the CHARLS and the gender of the first child for households having at least one child in or after 2003 for the CHFS.

Table A.14: Subsample check: High and low gender-ratio provinces (after 2003 samples only)

	IV: CHARLS (mostly rural)			IV: CHFS(mostly urban)		
VARIABLES	*any-transfer*	*amount*	*visit days*	*any-transfer*	*amount*	*visit days*
Low gender-ratio provinces						
$maleP$	0.0418	-30.36	-10.22	-0.00266	-421.3*	10.49
	(0.0591)	(385.4)	(12.11)	(0.0458)	(231.0)	(17.75)
sex_ratioK	-0.00135	-254.9	7.162	-0.0331	-228.8*	-4.708
	(0.0392)	(220.0)	(6.782)	(0.0300)	(138.7)	(9.741)
$maleP \times sex\_ratioK$	0.0292	228.6	36.96***	0.0274	249.2	-15.74
	(0.0507)	(358.5)	(13.74)	(0.0477)	(182.5)	(13.99)
$sex\_ratioK+$	0.028	-26.33	44.12***	-0.006	20.40	-20.45**
$maleP \times sex\_ratioK$	(0.025)	(243.4)	(11.26)	(0.032)	(151.6)	(9.702)
Observations	3,373	3,373	3,373	2,672	2,672	2,672
R-squared	0.199	0.090	0.690	0.185	0.230	0.145
High gender-ratio provinces						
$maleP$	0.0959*	109.4	-15.82	-0.0270	-52.15	24.94
	(0.0499)	(758.5)	(19.98)	(0.0453)	(256.2)	(30.53)
sex_ratioK	-0.0326	-103.9	-19.32**	0.00924	-114.6	-16.13
	(0.0423)	(674.4)	(8.086)	(0.0485)	(178.1)	(12.19)
$maleP \times sex\_ratioK$	0.00560	630.6	83.06***	0.0430	147.1	13.21
	(0.0529)	(852.2)	(21.12)	(0.0484)	(280.7)	(35.44)
$sex\_ratioK+$	-0.027	526.6*	63.74***	0.052	32.46	-2.917
$maleP \times sex\_ratioK$	(0.027)	(318.2)	(16.47)	(0.056)	(170.3)	(35.67)
Observations	2,489	2,489	2,490	1,454	1,454	1,454
R-squared	0.265	0.065	0.717	0.255	0.316	0.199
P demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
O demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate statistical significance. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. $maleP$ is the gender of P. sex_ratioK is the gender ratio of K in the household of P and represents the mother demonstration effect. $sex\_ratioK + maleP \times sex\_ratioK$ shows the father demonstration effect. The three outcome variables are the dummy indicating whether parents provide any financial transfer to their elderly parents (*any-transfer*), the amount of any transfer provided (*amount*), and the number of days spent on visits paid to their elderly parents per year (*visit days*). The key controls are P's household-size, gender, age, income education, *hukou* status, whether live in urban areas, siblings, marital status, occupation, distance from O, and O's transfer to P, age, education, working status, retirement status, any deposit, *hukou* status, household income and hours of O taking care of P's K, depending on the availability of the information in the CHARLS and the CHFS. The standard error is clustered at the prefectural city level for the CHARLS and the cluster-level is the province-level in the CHFS. The IVs are the gender of the first child for households having at least one child in or after 2003 and the prefectural compliance index for the CHARLS and the gender of the first child for households having at least one child in or after 2003 for the CHFS. The sample only contains P who have their first child on or after 2003. This sample is split based on the province-level of gender-ratios.